In this paper three newly proposed stream ciphers S1, S2 and S3 are analyzed. These stream ciphers are designed with respect to different levels of GSM security. The results show that both S1 and S2 are vulnerable to the known plaintext attacks and S3 can not decrypt correctly. With negligible amount of computation and few known keystream bytes, S1 and S2 can be broken completely. Furthermore, simulation results show that S3 cannot work correctly. The conclusion is that these stream ciphers are either extremely weak or poorly designed so that they cannot play the role as the designers hope in GSM network security.
Introduction
Mobile communication has become an indispensable part of ordinary life in today's world. People can communicate with each other anywhere and anytime through mobile phones. However, the openness of wireless communications has caused many security problems. It is now believed that the security service is essential to the success of a mobile communication network. The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) [1, 2] is the standard for digital mobile communications. It involves a set of security features such as applying stream cipher A5
in encryption/decryption.
Due to the fact that the A5 algorithm recommended in GSM standard is a proprietary algorithm and A5/1 is subject to export control, many efforts have been made towards designing new non-proprietary encryption algorithms. In Refs. [3, 4] , three stream ciphers are proposed for GSM applications. So far, we do not see any analysis of these three stream ciphers elsewhere. They are claimed to be efficient and secure. However, we will show in this paper that the three stream ciphers proposed are either extremely weak or poorly designed. Both S1 and S2 are vulnerable to known plaintext attacks and S3 cannot decrypt correctly. With negligible amount of computation and few known keystream bytes, S1 and S2 can be broken completely.
The organization of this paper is as follows: first we will give a review on the three newly proposed stream ciphers in section 2, especially on the key generator and two operation modes of stream cipher S2. Our analysis is presented in section 3 including the theoretical complexities to break S1, S2 and the experimental results illustrating the decryption failure of S3. Finally, some conclusions are given in section 4.
Three Newly Proposed Stream Ciphers
GSM is the first mobile communication system that has comprehensive security features. The A5 algorithm is a proprietary algorithm used in GSM for message encryption/decryption. Since A5/1 algorithm is subject to more and more suspicions on its security [5, 6] , many efforts have been made to design new stream ciphers for GSM network. In
Refs. [3, 4] the authors proposed three simple stream ciphers S1, S2, S3 to substitute the A5 algorithm with respect to different levels of security. Unfortunately, as we will show below, the three stream ciphers are all poorly designed.
We will give a complete description of the three stream ciphers S1, S2 and S3 in the following. The three stream ciphers are all based on the following key generator (KG).
Key generator (KG)
For an initial keystream of length l bytes, (M 0 ,M 1 ,…,M l−1 ), and an input message of length n bytes, (m 0 ,m 1 ,…,m n−1 ), the keystream (K 0 ,K 1 ,…,K n−1 ) of length n bytes, is generated according to the following procedures:
Step 1. Let i=0, j=0, N=170, cc=0;
Step 2.
Step 3. Let K i =M j ; N=(N+m i )mod2 8 ; i=i+1; j=j+1; cc=cc+1;
If j=l then reset j to 0;
If cc=256 then reset cc to 0;
If i=n then exit; else goto Step 2,  where N is an eight-bit string used to change M 0 by XOR operation at the beginning of each cycle; ⊕ denotes bit-wise XOR. cc is a number added to M j (j=0,…,l−1) so as to increase the randomness of M j . Note that the initial value of cc and N can be any number from 0 to 255. In the above design, take the number 170 (10101010) 2 as the default value of N and 0 as the default value of cc.
Stream cipher S1
The stream cipher S1, as shown in Fig.1 , consists of the KG and an XOR operator. The ciphertext (c i ) is obtained by XOR between the input message (m i ) and the output (K i ) of KG on a byte-by-byte basis. In general, there are two operation modes of stream cipher S2, Fig.3 shows the mode 1.
Mode 2: instead of using eight parallel LFSR-1s as in mode 1, this mode is just the direct implementation of S2 with the clock of LFSR-1 eight times as fast as that of KG.
Stream cipher S3
This cipher is designed as the most reliable stream cipher for GSM applications. It consists of the KG, two LFSRs, and three XOR operators. The two LFSRs are maximum-length LFSRs with known tap sequences (33,13,0) and (37,6,4,1,0) respectively. As Fig.4 shows, this cipher works according to the following rule:
Step 1. If (K i ⊕m i )mod2 is 1 , then the LFSR-2 is clocked; Else (K i ⊕m i )mod2=0, then the LFSR-3 is clocked;
Step 2. The keystream K′ i is obtained by using XOR operation between the output of the LFSR-2 and the output of LFSR-3;
Step 3. The ciphertext, (c i ), is obtained by using the XOR operation between the input message, (m i ), and the keystream (K′ i ) on a byte-by-byte basis. The keys of stream cipher S3 are the initial states of the LFSR-2, LFSR-3, and the secret parameters of the KG.
The security level of the stream ciphers S1, S2, S3 is in an ascending order with S3 having the highest level of security. In Ref. [3] , the authors conclude that if the initial keystream M being random, then all the three stream ciphers are secure. However, as we will show below that it is not true.
Cryptanalysis of the Three Stream Ciphers S1, S2, S3
In this section, we will break the stream ciphers S1, S2 and show that the stream cipher S3 can not correctly decrypt. Since known-plaintext attack is the most basic attack that a good stream cipher should resist successfully, we will simply implement this kind of attack on these three stream ciphers.
A known-plaintext attack on S1
Note that S1 is the direct implementation of the key generator to encrypt messages and there are no complicated nonlinear permutations used in this cipher. This is S1's vital flaw. Assume that the key of S1 consists of the initial keystream (M 0 ,M 1 ,…,M l−1 ) and the secret parameters N and cc. We know a segment of the generated keystream (K i ). Our task is to recover the key from the known segment of (K i ). Note that we process on a byte-by-byte basis.
We have following equations according to the description of KG: 
Thus we can recover cc from the last equation of (2) by an exhaustive search through {0,1} 8 which is computationally negligible. Then from the second last equation of (2) we can also restore N by an exhaustive over {0,1} 8 . The computation amount is also negligible. With the knowledge of N and cc, we can simply recover the initial keystream (M 0 ,M 1 ,…,M l−1 ) using l exhaustive searches through {0,1} 8 , thus the total complexity of above procedures is O(l) with l+2 bytes of keystream known, which means the stream cipher S1 is extremely weak.
An known-plaintext attack on S2
We first focus on the operation mode 1 of S2. Assume that the 1 LFSR-1 corresponds to the least significant bit of the output byte. We know a segment of the generated keystream and the feedback polynomial of LFSR-1. Our aim is to recover the initial states of the eight LFSRs and the initial keystream M, secret parameters N and cc.
Our basic technique is that when adding (x+y)mod2 8 , it has the same effect as x 0 ⊕y 0 with respect to the least significant bits x 0 and y 0 , where ⊕ denotes the XOR operation. Thus we have: . We can try every combination, for it actually has no effect on the total complexity of our attack. So we can safely deal with the situation that is known.
In this case, we can transform the variables with in (4) into linear combinations of . For GSM applications where , we can get linearly independent equations from above equation system with overwhelming probability. Then we solve these linearly independent equations to recover the initial state of Thus we can get similar equation systems as (3) with respect to the second least significant bits. Assume we have got the ith least significant bits and the initial state of i+1 LFSR-1, then with respect to the i+1th least significant bits and the initial state of i+2 LFSR-1 with 6 0 ≤ ≤ i we have: 
where A i and B denote the carriers such that: 
B is the carry to the i+1th bit calculated from 
Note that all the A j s and B can be easily calculated from the known information. Thus we will regard them as known parameters. Other parameters such as , and in (5) 
, we have: 
, we can simply try every combination w no effect on the total complexity of our attack. So we can also deal with the situation that is known. In this case, we can transform the variables with in (8) into linear combinations of . For GSM applications where , we can get linearly independent equations from above equation system with overwhelming probability. Then we solve these linearly independent equations to recover the initial state of hich has actually ) ) ) ( ,..., ,
,...,
according to (5) . The following is our total attack:
Parameters: feedback polynomial with tap sequence (32,7,6,2,0);
Step 1. input the value of l;
Derive a linear equation system of 2l linear equations from the first 2l bytes of keystream as in (3) and solve it to get the initial values , ,..., ,
Step 2. Compute A j and B, for
, from the known bits; for i=0 to 6
Derive a linear equation system of 2l linear equations from the first 2l bytes of keystream as in (5) too. The complexity of our attack on mode 2 is also O(1) with 2l known keystream bytes, thus we can safely affirm that the stream cipher S2 is so weak in security that it should not be used in GSM applications.
Analysis of the stream cipher S3
In this section, we will show that the proposed stream cipher S3 can not decrypt correctly. From Fig.4 , we can see that the two LFSRs work in a stop/go manner whose clocks are controlled by the XOR outcome of K i and m i . Since S3 works in a self-synchronization fashion, it is obvious that if the same initial states and the same initial keystream are enclosed into the two LFSRs and the key generator respectively, then the clock behaviours of LFSR-2 and LFSR-3 on the receiver side are not the same as those on the sender side. Thus in general the output of the XOR outcome K′ i on the receiver side is not the byte encrypted to the message byte m i , which means S3 cannot decrypt correctly. On the other side, if one wish to choose the initial states of the two LFSRs and the initial keystream of the key generator in such a way that on the receiver side it can decrypt correctly, then he will be confronted with the problem that without the knowledge of the message m i , he has to simulate the correct clock behaviour that can decrypt the ciphertext c i , which is impossible for practical applications.
Experimental results. We have made simulation experiments to test the stream cipher S3 in C language on a Pentium 4 2.5GHz processor. All the experimental results show that S3 cannot decrypt correctly. Here we only list the results of mode 1 which apply eight parallel LFSRs for LFSR-2 and LFSR-3 respectively. The tap sequences of the two LFSRs are (33,13,0) and (37,6,4,1,0) respectively. We use RC4 as random noise source to provide the initial states of the LFSRs and the initial keystream of KG. The results are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3. In each table, the bytes order is assumed as from left to right and from top to bottom. Similarly, we can use LFSRs whose clocks are eight times as fast as that of KG, the results are the same, we omit them. Table 1 The 100 input message bytes   b0 aa  f7  3c  af  b8  ca  ae  f6  57  2b dd 17 6a  fc  45 15 c4 69  7f  a5  59 20 13 39 19 12 06 2e 23  8f  75 3d 16 a8  c1  5b 3b d4 14  97 30 dd 08 73 80 c6  6a 35 54  1a  ce  ba  cc  aa  a1  35  f0  c9 42  0e  1e  9b f9  0b 2e  20 34  ac  0c  1c  4a  18 54 1e  90 34 d9 33  ff  bf  23 67 cf  be  97 ed  c5  f0  80  d1 20 65 55 18 b4 e1 11 72 e2 We can see from above tables that the decrypted bytes are hardly the same as those in the corresponding input messages, which illustrates that the stream cipher S3 cannot decrypt correctly in general.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze three stream ciphers S1, S2 and S3 designed for GSM security applications. Our results show that both S1 and S2 are vulnerable to the known-plaintext attacks and S3 cannot decrypt correctly.
Hence, the three stream ciphers should not be used in practice. It is an interesting problem and our future work to improve these three stream ciphers against the attacks in this paper.
